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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Urrizaga appeals from the district court's decision to summarily dismiss
his successive post-conviction petition, asserting that it erred by not appointing counsel
to assist him in that case.
this regard.

He contends that the district court made two errors in

First, the district court abused its discretion by deciding the merits of

Mr. Urrizaga's petition before determining whether his motion for appointment of
counsel should have been granted. Second, it erred by not appointing counsel even
though Mr. Urrizaga had articulated facts which gave rise to a potential claim allowing a
successive post-conviction petition.

Specifically, he alleged that his original post-

conviction attorney had not investigated the underlying case in which Mr. Urrizaga had
alleged error, but rather, had gathered evidence on a different case, which had, in fact,
been dismissed. These allegations raised the possibility of a valid claim that and, as
such, entitled him to an attorney pursuant to statute. Because the order dismissing this
petition without the appointment of counsel was erroneous, this Court should vacate
that order and remand this case for further proceedings with the assistance of counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Urrizaga originally pied guilty to trafficking drugs and was sentenced to a
unified term of twenty-two years, with twelve years fixed.

(R., p.32.)

He was

subsequently notified of misconduct which occurred at the Idaho State forensic
laboratory, and he filed a post-conviction alleging that misconduct had affected the
evidence in his case. See Urrizaga v. State, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 400, pp.1-2

1

(Ct. App. March 14, 2013). 1 The district court summarily dismissed that petition when
Mr. Urrizaga, with the assistance of counsel, failed to present evidence supporting his
allegations. See id. at p.4. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at pp.4-5.
In that first post-conviction case, Mr. Urrizaga had attempted to argue that the
reason he was unable to present the necessary evidence was because his attorney had
investigated a different criminal case in association with his claims. See id. at 4. The
Court of Appeals refused to consider that argument, as it had not been raised before the
district court. Id. As such, Mr. Urrizaga filed a successive petition for post-conviction
relief, reasserting his original claim and alleging that his post-conviction attorney's
insufficient investigation formed a valid basis to file a successive petition.
R., pp.11-17.)

(See

In regard to the claim regarding post-conviction counsel, Mr. Urrizaga

stated he was collaterally challenging the conviction entered in Twin Falls County Case
No. CR-03-3282. (R., p.11.) He asserted that he received an update on post-conviction
counsel's investigation, which involved a different case - Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-03-0633. 2

(R., p.17.)

He attached a copy of a letter from his original post-

conviction counsel to his successive petition.

(R., p.22.)

That letter informed

Mr. Urrizaga that counsel had investigated the lab results associated with Case No. CR03-0633. (R., p.22.)
The district court, however, issued a notice of intent to dismiss the successive
petition.

It began by discussing the merits of Mr. Urrizaga's claim, identifying two

reasons it believed it should be dismissed:

"First, the reasons for the claim have

This opinion was issued to resolve the issues Mr. Urrizaga pursued on appeal pro se
when the district court summarily denied his initial petition for post-conviction relief.
1

2

already been presented in a post-conviction relief claim .... Second, the claim suffers
from the same deficiency as [the original) claim." (R., p.36.) It did not address the issue
Mr. Urrizaga raised in regard to his original post-conviction attorney's insufficient
investigation.

(See generally R.) As a result of its determination that Mr. Urrizaga's

claims were frivolous, the district court denied his request for post-conviction counsel on
the successive petition. (R., p.37.)
Mr. Urrizaga requested additional time to file a response to the notice of intent to
dismiss, which was granted.
filed.

(See R., pp.45-46.)

(R., pp.40-43.)

However, no such response was ever

Accordingly, the district court summarily dismissed the

successive petition for the reasons articulated in the notice of intent to dismiss.
(R., p.46.) Mr. Urrizaga timely appealed from that decision. (R., pp.60-62.)

2

The Idaho Data Repository indicates that all five counts of possession of a controlled
substance in Twin Falls Case Number CR-03-0633 were dismissed by the prosecutor.

3

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by not appointing post-conviction counsel in light of the
fact that Mr. Urrizaga had asserted facts which raised the possibility of a viable postconviction claim.

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Not Appointing Post-Conviction Counsel In
Light Of The Fact That Mr. Urrizaga Had Asserted Facts Which Raised The
Possibility Of A Viable Post-Conviction Claim
A.

Introduction
Mr. Urrizaga alleged in his verified petition that his original post-conviction

attorney had investigated the wrong criminal case in connection with his original
petition, which was summarily dismissed for a failure to provide evidence in support of
the allegations in the petition. As such, that verified petition presents the possibility of
a valid claim that post-conviction counsel's deficient performance deprived Mr. Urrizaga
of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his post-conviction claims. Mr. Urrizaga did raise
potential viable claims in his original post-conviction petition.

As such, the district

court's decision to not appoint Mr. Urrizaga an attorney is in error and the ultimate order
summarily dismissing his petition should be vacated.

B.

As Mr. Urrizaga Alleged Facts That Establish A Possibly-Viable Post Conviction
Claim, The District Court's Decision To Summarily Dismiss That Petition Without
Appointing Counsel Was Erroneous
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Urrizaga was able to properly bring this successive

post-conviction petition. Idaho generally only permits one post-conviction challenge to a
conviction in which the petitioner should raise all appropriate challenges.
4908; see McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999).

I.C. § 19-

However, a successive

petition is allowed if there is sufficient reason to justify such a petition. I.C. § 19-4908.
The ineffective performance of post-conviction counsel may provide such a sufficient
reason.

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 (Ct. App. 2008).

Therefore, since

Mr. Urrizaga's claims were re-alleged in a successive petition based on the fact that his

5

original post-conviction attorney had failed to investigate the right case (see R., pp.1117),3 his successive petition is proper.
Additionally, even though Idaho does not recognize a constitutional right to postconviction counsel, see Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing

Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), Idaho law does permit counsel to be
appointed if the petitioner demonstrates the potential of a valid post-conviction claim.
LC. § 19-4904; Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004).

"[W]hen a district

court is ' ... presented with a request for appointed counsel, the court must address this
request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case."' Charboneau, 140 Idaho at
792 (quoting Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 885 (Ct. App. 1997). If the district court does
not rule on the motion for appointment of counsel before it decides the merits of the
case, it abuses its discretion.

Id.

The remedy for such an abuse is to vacate the

dismissal of the post-conviction petition and remand the case for appointment of
counsel and allow that attorney to file an amended petition or present additional
evidence to support the claim before a determination in regard to the propriety of
summary dismissal is made. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793-94.
Denial of post-conviction counsel is inappropriate where the pro se petitioner has
articulated enough facts to set out the potential of a valid claim. "[T]he trial court should
keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be

3

In fact, post-conviction counsel had failed to investigate a case which, according to the
online repository, even resulted in a conviction. Since post-conviction relief is only
available to persons convicted of or sentenced for a crime, I.C. § 19-4901 (a), counsel's
investigation would not even have potentially led to information which would entitle
Mr. Urrizaga to relief. As such, that investigation is obviously insufficient to promote
Mr. Urrizaga's post-conviction petition.

6

conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, the also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." Swader v. State, 143
Idaho 651, 653-54 (2007) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 ));
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. Therefore, part of the point of having the ability to

request post-conviction counsel is to perfect the claims raised in the pro se petition.
See Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54; Charboneau, ·140 Idaho at 792-93. As such, "[i]f the

petitioner 'alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim,"' counsel should be
appointed in that case.

Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793) (emphasis added).

Mr. Urrizaga did articulate facts which raise the possibility of a valid claim in his
verified petition and affidavit, 4 specifically, that his post-conviction attorney performed
deficiently. (See R., pp.11-17.) Even though, in Idaho, there is no constitutional right to
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, per se, when post-conviction counsel
fails to adequately raise or pursue the petitioner's claims, that deficient performance
may deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. 5 Schwartz,
145 Idaho at 189 and 189 n.3; Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has never articulated a standard for evaluating the
performance of post-conviction counsel, Mr. Urrizaga assumes the Idaho courts would
apply the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984),

A verified pleading sets forth facts which may be considered as evidence in a postconviction proceeding. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993).
5 Despite this distinction, some Idaho opinions have referred to such claims as
assertions of "ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel."
See, e.g.,
Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420 (Ct. App. 2005).
4

7

requiring him to prove that post-conviction counsel's performance fell below a
reasonable standard, and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, in order
to prove his claim.
Inadequate preparation may constitute unreasonable performance by counsel.
e.g., Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494,496 (1999); Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139,
145-46 (Ct. App. 2006). "Generally, defense counsel is bound to conduct a prompt and
thorough investigation of his or her case."
(Ct. App. 2002).

Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190, 193

Furthermore, "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's decision [in this

regard] may be determined or greatly influenced by the defendant's statements of
behaviors."

Id.

Mr. Urrizaga alleged that his post-conviction attorney failed to

adequately prepare for this case by investigating the wrong case.

(R., p.11.)

allegations, which, at this point, are unrebutted, must be accepted as true.

His
See

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). However, Mr. Urrizaga offered more than
only his allegations; he included a letter from counsel with his petition that demonstrates
his attorney had investigated the wrong case.

(See R., p.22.)

As such, the only

evidence in the record demonstrates that post-conviction counsel had performed
unreasonably, as he had not conducted a reasonable or proper investigation.
Post-conviction counsel's unreasonable performance prejudiced Mr. Urrizaga.
First, Mr. Urrizaga's initial claims were all summarily dismissed because he did not
"provide any specific information about the lab improprieties, their relation to his case, or
of the actual impact those improprieties may have had on his conviction."
(quoting Notice of Intent to Dismiss from CV-2011-3392).)

(R., p.36

Since counsel had

investigated the wrong case, there is a reasonable possibility that, had counsel

8

investigated the proper case, evidence supporting Mr. Urrizaga's claim would have
come to light. Therefore, post-conviction counsel's insufficient performance prejudiced
Mr. Urrizaga. As such, because Mr. Urrizaga alleged the possibility of a valid claim for
insufficient performance of post-conviction counsel, the district court should have
appointed counsel to assist Mr. Urrizaga in his successive post-conviction claim. See
I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793; Judd, 148 Idaho at 24.

Mr. Urrizaga Alleged Facts That Were Sufficient To Raise Potentially Viable
Claims Meriting The Appointment Of Post-Conviction Counsel

C.

Mr. Urrizaga alleged in his verified petition that "the ISP Forensic Laboratory
either accidentally or purposely substituted 'unaccounted for' drugs that they held
hidden on the premises in order to secure a conviction or force a plea in my case.
Without false testing at the ISP Forensic Lab, I do not believe I would have been
prosecuted." (R., p.16.) As a verified petition (see R., p.26), this petition sets forth facts
to be considered by the district court and carries the same probative force as an
affidavit. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). At the summary judgment
phase, "[a] court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true,"
though it need not accept his legal conclusions. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153
(2008).
In this case, there was no answer filed by the State.

(See genera!ly R.)

Therefore, all Mr. Urrizaga's allegations are unrebutted and must be accepted as true.

See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.

One of those unrebutted allegations is that the

laboratory "either accidentally or purposely substituted 'unaccounted for drugs' ... in
order to secure a conviction . . . . "

(R., p.16 (emphasis added).)
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In order to be

admissible as evidence, the proponent of the evidence must authenticate the evidence.
State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 646-47 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting I.

901).

An

opponent to such evidence may, by showing that the evidence has been tampered with
or meddled with in some way, undermine the authenticity of the evidence, thereby
making it inadmissible. See, e.g., id. In the underlying case, where Mr. Urrizaga was
convicted of trafficking narcotics (see R, p.1 ·1 ), if the evidence about the potentiallyillegal nature of the substance recovered from Mr. Urrizaga is inadmissible because it
was tampered with at the laboratory, his conviction could not stand for lack of sufficient
evidence.

Therefore, his allegation that the laboratory substituted unregistered

narcotics as evidence in his case, which is unrefutted and so must be accepted as true
at this point, see Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, raises the possibility of a valid claim, and

therefore, counsel should have been appointed. 6

I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau, 140

Idaho at 793.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Urrizaga respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order summarily
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition and remand this case for further
proceedings with the assistance of counsel.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2013.

IAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

6

Of note is the fact that when Mr. Urrizaga raised this claim in his initial petition, the
district court presumably found that it raised a potential claim, since it did appoint him
post-conviction counsel. (See, e.g., R., p.13.)
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